After all, if we think of appraisal as something like perception, a matter of responding to what is out there in the world, and of bestowal as defin like action, a matter of doing something and creating something, we should recognize that the responsiveness central to appraisal may itself depend on our active, creative choices.
Love (stanford encyclopedia of philosophy)
One might object that this conception of love as silencing the special value of others or to negative interpretations of our beloveds is irrational in a way that love is not. Union theorists define responded to this objection in several ways. In lovely follows, theories of love are tentatively and hesitantly classified into four types: love as union, love as robust concern, love as valuing, and love as an emotion.
Some loves develop so that the intimacy within the relationship is such as to allow for tender, teasing responses to each other, whereas other loves may not. It should be clear, however, that particular theories classified under one type sometimes also include, without contradiction, ideas central to other types.
Beautiful vs lovely: what is the difference?
By lofely, 3 and 4 seem to indicate a mode of concern that cannot be neatly assimilated to anything else. Consequently, we might say along the lines of Section 4.
Yet such a view would be inadequate, since the projected value, being relative to a particular individual, would do no theoretical work, and the would essentially be a variant of the robust concern view. However, union views, by doing away with a clear distinction between your interests and mine, thereby undermine this sort of independence and so undermine the autonomy of the lovers.
The types identified here overlap to some extent, and in some cases classifying particular theories may involve excessive pigeonholing.
As Taylor puts it: To summarize: if x loves y then x wants to benefit and be with y etc. To exhibit a pattern of such emotions focused on oneself and subfocused on being a mother, for example, is to care about the place being a mother has in the kind of life you find worth living—in your identity as a person; to care in this way is to value being a mother as a part of your concern for your own identity.
According to Brownp. For if the aim is not just to know loevly lovely but to improve yourself, you ought also to interact with others who are not just like yourself: interacting with such diverse others can help you recognize alternative possibilities for how to live and so define assess the relative merits of these possibilities. To have these good reasons seems to involve attributing different values to you now rather than formerly or rather than fefine someone else, yet this is precisely what Velleman denies is the case in making the distinction between love and respect the way he does.
If not, why not, and what is so special about love that requires a fundamentally different evaluative attitude than admiration and respect? The Value and Decine of Love Why do we love? Different theories approach these questions in different ways, but, as will become clear below, the question of justification is primary. Baierseeming to pick up on this understanding of love as exhibiting historicity, says p.
We know from personal experience just how painful it can be to rent an apartment, and we think lobely should be faster, easier, and more transparent. There is surely something very right about the idea that love, as an attitude central to deeply personal relationships, should not be understood as a state that can simply come and go. The idea is that the union is a union of concern, devine that when I act out of that concern it is not for my sake alone or for your sake alone but for our sake.
Each of these answers to the question of why we love understands it to be asking about love quite generally, abstracted away from details of particular relationships. Love is therefore risky—indeed, all the more risky because of the way the identity of the lover is defined in part through the love.
This, however, would be disrespectful and demeaning, not the sort of attitude that love is. Badhwarp. Thus, Helm claims, all emotions have not only a target and a formal object as indicated abovebut also a focus: a background object the subject cares about in terms of which the implicit evaluation of defie target is made intelligible.
The difference between beautiful and lovely
What robust concern views seem to miss, Ebels-Duggan suggests, is the way love involves interacting agents, each with a capacity for autonomy the recognition and engagement with which is an essential part of love. However, love and respect are different kinds of responses to the same value. Yet without further argument these claims seem like mere bullet biting.
I love doing philosophy or being a father.
A dog. Yet this seems inadequate: surely there are attitudes towards persons intermediate between having a desire with a person as its object and loving the person. The loss of a love can therefore make one feel no longer oneself in ways poignantly described by Nussbaum Indeed, keeping the idea that you want to some degree to benefit him, an idea Velleman rejects, seems to be essential to understanding the conceptual tension between loving someone and not wanting to help him, a tension Velleman does not fully acknowledge.
Moreover, in providing a bestowal of love, care is needed to distinguish love from other personal attitudes such as admiration and respect: do these other attitudes involve bestowal? It was lovely to have you here! Rather, what he offers is an explanation of the selectivity of my love, an explanation that as a matter of fact makes my response be that of love rather than mere respect.
Whereas Jollimore tries to combine separate elements of appraisal and of bestowal in a singleHelm and Bagley offer s that reject the metaphysical presupposition that values must be either prior to love as with appraisal or posterior to love as with bestowalinstead understanding the love and the values to emerge simultaneously. Noun A chorus line of young lovelies danced on the stage. dfeine
Two examples Baier gives pp. For example, if I am afraid of the approaching hailstorm, I thereby evaluate it as dangerous, and what explains this evaluation is the way that hailstorm bears on my vegetable garden, which I care about; my garden, therefore, is the focus of my fear. This is because, Solomon suggests, in loving someone, I want myself to be better so as to be worthy of his love for me.
Lovely | definition of lovely by merriam-webster
Along these lines, Friedmantaking her inspiration in part from Delaneyargues that we should understand the sort of union at issue in love to be a kind of federation of selves: On the federation define, a third unified entity is constituted by the interaction of the lovers, one lovely involves the lovers acting in concert across a range of conditions and for a range of purposes. Of course, to understand love in terms of desires is not to leave other emotional responses out in the cold, for these emotions should be understood as lovley of desires.
Princeton's WordNet 5.